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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Suretyship in Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC) has incorporated
many suretyship principles into its provisions and has thereby
changed and modified some of the traditional tenets of that field.
The purpose of this Note is to compare the provisions of the UCC
with corresponding traditional suretyship principles and to note the
similarities and differences between the UCC and the Negotiable
Instruments Law (NIL) in this area. The scope of this discussion
will be limited to those suretyship principles which are referred to
in Article 3 of the UCC and which bear directly upon the surety-
ship relation.
I. THE SURETY AND SECTION 3-606 OF THE UCC
A surety or guarantor has been defined as "one who promises
to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, or hy-
pothecates property as security therefor."' The UCC does not de-
fine the term "surety" as such, but it does state that the term
"'Surety' includes guarantor."2
A. The Meaning of Section 3-606
Perhaps the most significant provision of the UCC affecting
suretyship is section 3-606. This section deals with discharge of
parties liable on a negotiable instrument where the holder impairs
collateral, or the right of recourse. This section provides in part
that:
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the
extent that without such party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not
to sue any person against whom the party has to the
knowledge of the holder a right of recourse or agrees to
suspend the right to enforce against such person the in-
strument or collateral or otherwise discharges such per-
son ... or
1 CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 2787. The California statute is representative of the gen-
erally accepted definition of "surety." See also RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 82 (1941)
[hereinafter cited as REsTATEMENT]; SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP 6-9 (1950) [hereinafter
cited as SIMPSON].
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(40). Citations are to the 1962 official
text published by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. [hereinafter cited as UCC]. The UCC adopts the
reasoning of the RESTATEMENT § 82, which equates the two terms.
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(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument
given by or on behalf of the party or any person against
whom he has a right of recourse....
At the outset it should be noted that the scope of section 3-606
is quite broad in that it deals with the discharge of any party having
a right of recourse and is not limited to persons who are secondarily
liable on the instrument. In addition, the right of recourse may
arise from any transaction. The broad scope of this section can be
best shown by the following illustration. Assume that a person gives
a negotiable instrument secured by a mortgage and that he subse-
quently transfers the property to a grantee who assumes the mort-
gage. This latter transaction places the original mortgagor in the
position of a surety and he gains a right of recourse against the
grantee. Consequently, if the holder of the negotiable instrument
prejudices the mortgagor's right of recourse by any act or agreement
set forth in section 3-606, the mortgagor would be discharged.
The "extent" of the mortgagor's discharge is uncertain. Sec-
tion 3-606 presents an interesting problem of interpretation in this
respect. Is the term "extent" used to limit discharge to the extent
of injury, or to the extent that consent was not given?' If a holder
extends the time of payment for the primary obligor without re-
serving his rights against the indorser, or without obtaining the in-
dorser's consent to the extension, and if UCC subsection 3-606 (1)
(a) is construed to mean that lack of consent will discharge any
party having a right of recourse against the party whose duties have
been modified or extinguished, the indorser would be discharged.
On the other hand, if UCC subsection 3-606(1) (a) is construed
to mean discharge to the extent of injury, the indorser would not be
discharged unless he could show injury stemming from the exten-
sion of the time of payment. The comments to section 3-606 do
not help resolve this question.
By interpreting this section in light of suretyship principles, the
conclusion could be reached that the term "extent" limits discharge
to the extent of injury. Traditional suretyship law principles pro-
tect the surety when the principal and creditor modify their con-
3UCC § 3-606(1). (Emphasis added.)
4 It appears that the New York State Law Revision Commission does not agree with
the first alternative. The Commission stated that "the Code... omits any language
limiting the security's discharge to a case where the agreement to suspend rights to
enforce against the principal debtor results in prejudice to the surety." 2 Nnw YoRK
LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1179
(1955).
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tract without the surety's consent. The most rigorous rule was the
doctrine of strictissimi juris whereby a gratuitous surety was dis-
charged by any modification of the principal's obligation to which
the surety did not consent.5 This doctrine was relaxed by later
suretyship law which provides that where the modification was
clearly beneficial to the surety he is not discharged.6 In addition,
where the modification is collateral and does not affect the surety,
there is no discharge.7 It should be noted that many cases have held
gratuitous sureties liable by resorting to such fictions as implied con-
sent or by construing modifications of the original contract as being
merely collateral.8 In addition, the suretyship principles applicable
to compensated sureties provide full discharge for modification with-
out the surety's consent where the modification materially increases
the surety's risk, and provides discharge to the extent of loss for any
modification which does not materially increase the risk.' Further-
more, traditional suretyship law treats an extension of the time of
payment as a distinct type of contract modification. Under this
suretyship principle the creditor could expressly reserve his rights
against the surety, thereby preventing his discharge."0 Failure of the
ereditor to reserve his rights results in discharge of the surety where
he has not consented to the extension of the time of payment."
Traditional suretyship law also provides that where the creditor ima-
5 See RESTATEMENT § 128, comment f; SIMPSON 330-31.
.6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 E.g., Paulk v. Williams, 28 Ga. App. 183, 110 S.E. 632 (1922); Boston Box Co.
v. Rosen,'254 Mass. 331, 150 N.E. 177 (1926); Becker v. Faber, 280 N.Y. 146, 19
N.E.2d 997 (1939). Contra, Washington Fin. Corp. v. Glass, 74 Wash. 653, 134
Pac. 480 (1913). See SIMPSON 342-47.
These decisions can be explained by an apparent change in the attitude of the courts
toward gratuitous sureties. They apparently are no longer regarded as persons who
should be protected by the law from their own imprudence.
9 See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Golden Fire Brick Co., 191 U.S. 416
(1903); Gunsul v. American Sur. Co., 308 Ill. 312, 139 N.E. 620 (1923); REsTATE-
MENT § 128 (b). The rationale upon which these suretyship principles are based is that
the surety agreed to answer for a particular duty owed by the principal and for that duty
only. Moreover, it provided that the modification had the legal effect of discharging
the original contract by mutual rescission and substituting a new contract to which the
surety never agreed to be bound. Other courts have held that where the modification
increased the principal's burden of performance the surety was discharged because his
contract was altered in that his risk was increased without his consent. See RESTATE-
MENT § 128, comment d; SIMPSON 330-31.
10 See Brocton Say. Bank v. Shapiro, 311 Mass. 695, 42 N.E.2d 826 (1942); Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. v. J.H.C. Corp., 187 Misc. 416, 64 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct), afI'd
mem.,, 271 App. Div. 823, 64 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1946); RESTATEMENT § 129.
"1See Braun v. Crew, 183 Cal. 728, 192 Pac. 531 (1920); Skinner v. D. Sullivan
& Co., 227 Ill. 93, 81 N.E. 11 (1907); RESTATEMENT § 129(1).
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pairs collateral and has knowledge of the suretyship relation, the
surety is discharged to the extent of injury. 2
Considering the foregoing suretyship principles and the cases
that limit discharge of a surety to the extent of injury,"m it would
be reasonable to conclude that the term "extent," as used in section
3-606, modifies discharge by limiting it to the extent of injury.
Such 'an interpretation would reflect a change from provisions of
the NIL such as subsection 120(6) which provides for full dis-
charge of persons secondarily liable where there has been an exten-
sion of the time of payment. Perhaps the change has merit since,
there is no valid reason for discharge where there has been no injury.
On the other hand, disregarding modern suretyship principles
and interpreting the term "extent" solely on, the basis of the lan-
guage of section 3,606, it would appear that the term means dis-
charge to the extent that consent was not given, since the section
does not refer to the term injury or to any other words of similar
import. This interpretation would, in effect, be a regression to the
largely abandoned suretyship principle of strictissimi juris, whereby
a gratuitous surety was fully discharged by any modification of the
principal's obligation.1" The result would be the discharge of any
suret without regard to whether injury or increase in risk has oc-
curred. This interpretation of section 3-606 can be justified by two
other provisions of subsection 3-606(1) '(a). First, the holder can al-
ways protect himself against the'surety by expressly reserving his
rights. 5 The only exception to this is where the holder unjustifiably
impairs collateral; in such instances it is reasonable to permit full
dischage of a surety in order to promote due care on the part of the
holder. Second, the nature of the agreements referred to in subsec-
tion 3-606 (1) is such that they materially modify the contract and in
most situations would increase the surety's risk. However, in a situ-
ation where there has been an extension of the time of payment,
the surety may benefit in that the obligor may be given the addi-
tional time needed to overcome a period of financial difficulty.
Viewing section 3-606 as intending discharge only to the extent
that consent was not given would dearly place an added burden
12 This result is based upon the theory that by impairing collateral the creditor also
impairs the surety's right of subrogation; consequently the surety should be discharged
to the extent that the creditor engendered harm to him. See Morton v. Dillon, 90 Va.
592, 595, 19 S. 654, 655 (1894); SIMPsON 372.
13 See note 8 supra.
14 RESTATEMENT § 128, comment f; SIMPSON 330-31.
15 It should be noted that § 3-606 (2) specifically sets forth the consequences of such
reservation of rights. See text accompanying notes 29-31 infra.
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upon the holder. Under subsection 3-606(1) (a), the holder would
have to be careful to reserve rights against parties he knew to be
sureties and whom he desired to hold liable on the instrument. Under
subsection 3-606(1) (b) the holder would have to refrain from un-
justifiably impairing collateral or suffer the consequences of full
discharge of any party having a right of recourse, regardless of
whether he had knowledge of the party's right of recourse. 6
While the most equitable approach would be to limit discharge
to the extent of actual injury occasioned by the holder's action to
which the party did not consent and in which the holder did not
expressly reserve his rights, it might be wiser to permit full discharge
of the party in order to promote greater care and prudence on the
part of the holder. This appears to be the only reason for arbitrarily
discharging a party where he has suffered no injury.
B. Modification of Suretyship Principles and the NIL by
Section 3-606
A significant change from the NIL is the substitution of the
term "right of recourse" in section 3-606 for the NIL term "per-
sons secondarily liable."' 7  Section 3-606 is thereby extended to
parties who may be primarily liable, such as an accommodation
maker, whereas section 120 of the NIL is limited to persons second-
arily liable. In addition, many courts have held that section 119 of
the NIL abrogates the traditional suretyship principle and precludes
discharge of an accommodation maker where the holder has ex-
18 It should be noted that S 3-606(1) (a) contains an exception which provides that
failure or delay by the holder in effecting any required presentment, protest, or notice
of dishonor against a party, does not discharge any party as to whom presentment, protest,
or notice of dishonor is effective or unnecessary, even though that party has a right of
recourse against the party discharged. An example of this is where there are two in-
dorsers to an instrument, A and B. Assume that A was the first indorser and entitled
to presentment and notice of dishonor as provided in § 3-413 of the UCC. Assume
further that B, the second indorser waives presentment and notice of dishonor. The
holder of the instrument fails to give notice of dishonor to either indorser, thereby
discharging A in accordance with S 3-501 (2). Since B waived notice of dishonor he
is not discharged under § 3-501(2). Moreover, the exception to § 3-606(1) (a)
makes it clear that even though A is discharged and B had a right of recourse against
A because A was a prior indorser, B is not discharged.
Subsection 3-606(2) sets forth the consequences of an express reservation of rights
by the holder against a party. It provides that the holder preserves all his rights against
such a party, and in addition, preserves the right of the party to pay the instrument, and
the party's right to recourse against others liable to him. The subsection does not spe-
cifically require the holder to give the party notice of the reservation of rights against
him.
17 See UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 120 [hereinafter cited as
NIL).
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tended the time of payment to the principal. 8 Section 3-606, by
dealing in terms of parties having a right of recourse, precludes this
result since the accommodation maker has a right of recourse against
the maker. In this respect it should be noted that under the NIL
the prevailing view was that a mortgagor-maker of a negotiable
instrument who subsequently transferred the property to a grantee
who assumed the mortgage was not discharged if the holder ex-
tended the time of payment to the grantee. 9 Under traditional
suretyship law the prevailing view was that the mortgagor would
be completely discharged.2" Similarly, under section 3-606 of the
UCC the mortgagor, who has a right of recourse against the grantee
who assumed the mortgage, will be discharged by the extension of
the time of payment. As previously discussed, the extent of dis-
charge may present a problem under the UCC.2"
A further change wrought by the UCC is that section 3-606
eliminates the traditional suretyship distinction between compensated
sureties and gratuitous sureties; one rule applies to both. Further-
more, subsection 3-606(1) (b), which deals with impairment of col-
lateral, does not require, as a prerequisite to discharge of the party,
that the holder have knowledge of the party's right of recourse
whereas traditional suretyship law generally required knowledge by
the creditor of the suretyship relation.22 This change imposes a
greater burden upon the holder for the consequences of his actions
where he has no knowledge of a party's right of recourse. Perhaps
this can be justified on the basis that any holder who would be im-
prudent enough to unjustifiably impair collateral is not entitled to
a right of action against such parties. The traditional suretyship re-
quirement of knowledge on the part of the creditor was based on the
theory that the surety's subrogation rights are impaired by any im-
pairment of collateral.' Thus, under traditional suretyship law the
18E.g,, Young v. Carr, 44 Ariz. 223, 36 P.2d 555 (1934); Hall v. Farmers' Bank,
74 Colo. 165, 220 Pac. 237 (1923). See BRlTroN, BILLS AND NOTES 702-04 (2d
ed. 1961).
19E.g., Mortgage Guar. Co. v. Chotiner, 8 Cal. 2d 110, 64 P.2d 138 (1936);
Washer v. Tontar, 128 Ohio St. 111, 190 NE. 231 (1934). See OSBORNE, MORT-
GAGES § 271 (1951).
20 E.g., Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hanford, 143 U.S. 187 (1892). See OSBORNE,
op. cit. rupra note 19, S 270.
21 See text accompanying notes 4-15 supra.
22 E.g., Patterson v. Brock, 14 Mo. 473 (1851); Parsons v. Harrold, 46 W. Va. 122,
32 S.E. 1002 (1899). Contra, Templeton v. Shakley, 107 Pa. 370 (1884). See RE-
STATEmENT S 114; SIMPSON 373.
23Morton v. Dillon, 90 Va. 592, 19 S.E. 654 (1894). See SIMPSoN 372.
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surety was discharged to the extent of injury24 but was not discharged
where he was indemnified, " or when the creditor makes reasonable
use of the security to collect from the principal.2" Subsection
3-606(1) (b) does not contain these specific provisions relating to
impairment of collateral, but it does provide that the impairment
must be "unjustifiable." This term may be somewhat similar to
the "reasonable use" proviso found in suretyship law.2" In addition,
if the term "extent" as used in section 3-606 is taken as limiting
discharge to the extent of injury,2" a surety who is indemnified
would not be discharged where the holder impaired collateral - a
result identical to that reached under the traditional suretyship prin-
ciples.
Subsection 3-606(2) of the UCC, which sets forth the rights
which are expressly reserved by the holder, is similar to its counter-
part in traditional suretyship law.29 Both preserve the holder's rights
against the party expressly named, the right of the party to pay the
instrument as of that time, and all the rights of the party to recourse
against others."° These consequences under suretyship law were
based on the theory that where the creditor agreed not to enforce his
rights against the principal and at the same time expressly reserved
his rights against the surety, the agreement was' in effect a covenant
not to sue, and as such, did not affect the rights and duties of the
surety.31 It can reasonably be as'sumed that the same line of reason-
ing was adopted in subsection 3-606(2).
24 Ibid.
25 E.g., Crim v. Fleming, 101 Ind. 154 (1884). See SIMPSON 374.
26 E.g., Berlin Nat'l Bank v. Guay, 76 N.H- 216, 81 Ad. 475 (1911). See RE-
STATEMENT § 122, comment d; SIMPSON 302-04.
27 Ibid. It should be noted that comment 5 of § 3-606 of the UCC refers to § 9-207
for aid in defining "unjustifiable impairment of collateral."
28 See text accompanying notes 4-15 supra. It is interesting to note that § 3-606
(1) (b) provides that the principal may also be discharged when the holder unjustifi-
ably impairs collateral given by the principal or on his behalf. The broad effect of this
provision can best be shown by illustration. Assume that a party gives collateral for an
instrument on behalf of the principal and in addition, becomes an accommodation
party to the instrument. Assume further that the holder unjustifiably impairs the col-
lateral thereby discharging both the surety and the principal in accordance with § 3-606
(1) (b) of the UCC. Discharge of the principal would in turn discharge all parties
to the instrument under UCC § 3-601(3). In addition, § 3-802(1) (b) which pro-
vides that where the underlying obligor is discharged on the instrument he is also
discharged on the underlying obligation would work to totally discharge the principal.
The effect of these provisions is to leave an imprudent holder-creditor without recourse
on the instrument or on the underlying obligation.
29 See note 16 supra.
3 0 See UCC § 3-606(2); Dean v. Rice, 63 Kan. 691, 66 Pac. 992 (1901); RE-
STATEMENT § 122, comment d; SIMPSON 302-04.
31 Ibid.
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The NIL, subsections 120(5) and (6), states that a secondar-
ily liable person is discharged where the holder releases the prin-
cipal debtor or postpones the right to enforce the instrument unless
the holder expressly reserves his right of recourse against him. How-
ever, the NIL is silent as to the effect of the reservation of rights
upon the person secondarily liable although most courts have held
that under the NIL the appropriate principles of suretyship are ap-
plicable. 2
IL RIGHT OF THE SURETY TO RECOVER PAYMENT UNDER
SURETYSHIP PRINCIPLES, THE UCC, AND THE NIL
Suretyship law recognizes three basic rights" of the surety who
pays or who would otherwise be obliged to perform the principal's
obligation: (1) the right of reimbursement;34 (2) the right of sub-
rogation;"s and (3) the right of exoneration. 8 The NIL did not
change these rights and accordingly, most courts applying the NIL
recognized these rights as expounded by traditional suretyship law.3
The UCC, with a few modifications, also accepts these traditional
suretyship rights3 8
A. The Right of Reimbursement - Sections 1-103 and 3-415(5)
of the UCC
The right of reimbursement was founded in equity and involves
a promise by the principal to reimburse the consensual surety - a
promise implied in fact and based on the principal-surety con-
32 See, e.g., Brill v. Brandt, 176 Misc. 580, 26 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct.), afI'd, 263
App. Div. 811, 31 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1941). See BRrrroN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 701.33 In addition to the three basic rights, suretyship law also recognizes sub-suretyship,
i.e., the relationship in which a party is a surety for another surety, and the right of the
surety to proceed against the sub-surety. Under suretyship law, such a relationship
could arise only by express agreement between the sureties. See Paul v. Berry, 78 Ill.
158 (1875); ARANT, SURETYSHIP AND GuARANTY 12 (1931); REsTATEmE T S
146(c). Subsection 3-414(2) of the UCC recognizes the sub-suretyship relation be-
tween indorsers of an instrument. It provides that, unless otherwise agreed, an in-
dorser can proceed against prior indorsers. UCC § 3-414 (2). See 1 HAWKLAND, A
TRANsAcTioNAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM CONMRCIAL CODE 565 (1964). The
NIL contains a similar provision in § 66.34 See Ford v. Strobridge, Nelson 24 (Ch. 1632); REsTATEMENT § 104; SIMPSON
225; Loyd, The Surety, 66 U. Pa. L REv. 40, 58 (1917).
35 See, e.g., Munsey Trust Co. v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 976 (Ct. Cl. 1946),
rev'd, 322 U.S. 234 (1947), where it was stated that a consensual surety is one who be-
came a surety with the consent of the principal. See RSTATEmENT § 141; SImpSON
206.
30See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Lewis State Bank, 58 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1932).
See REsTATEMENT § 112; SIMPSON 198.
37Producers' State Bank v. Danciger, 218 Mo. App. 39, 264 S.W. 1000 (1924).
See BRrrroN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 699-700.
89 See UCC §5 3-415 (5), 3-603 (2), 3-201, 1-103.
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tract.3 9 With a nonconsensual surety there is no contract right of
reimbursement. Therefore, if such right is to exist, it must be based
upon the theory of unjust enrichment."0 It should be noted, how-
ever, that the nonconsensual surety may have the right of subro-
gation.
41
The UCC has no specific provisions dealing with the right of
reimbursement with the exception of subsection 3-415(5). This
section gives an accommodation party a right of recourse on the in-
strument against the accommodated party and is, in effect, a codifi-
cation of the, suretyship principle giving the accommodation party
the right of reimbursement against the accommodated party.42 This
is an. improvement over the NIL in that it eliminates a curious prob-
lem that at least one court had in interpreting the NIL. In Quimby
v. Varnum,4' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that
although an accommodation indorser who paid on the instrument
was remitted to his former rights under section 121 of the NIL,4"
he was still unable to bring an action against the accommodated
party on the instrument because he had no former rights against the
accommodated party based on the instrument. Despite the Quimby
ruling, most courts interpreting the NIL recognized the accommoda-
tion party's right to proceed against all prior parties to the instru-
ment, including the accommodated party.
45
While subsection 3-415 (5) of the UCC extends only to accom-
modation parties, it should be noted that section 1-103 provides that,
unless specifically displaced by a provision of the UCC, the prin-
ciples of equity are to supplement its provisions. Thus, it would
seem that under the UCC, the right of reimbursement is still effec-
tive as to all sureties other than accommodation parties, who are
provided for in subsection 3-415 (5). It might also be possible to
extend subsection 3-415(5), by analogy, to include all sureties,
thereby eliminating the necessity of resorting to equitable principles.
39 Howell v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 654
(1934). See RESTATEMBNT § 104, comment d; SIMPSON 226.
40See Hecker v. Ohio, 64 Ohio St. 398, 60 N.E. 555 (1901); RESTATEMENT §
104(2). But see SIMPSON 226 n.71.
41 See text accompanying notes 46-49 infra.
42 See UCC § 3-415, comment 5.
43190 Mass. 211, 76 N.E. 671 (1906).
44NIL § 121 provides, in part, that "Where the instrument is paid by a party sec-
ondarily liable thereon, it is not discharged; but the party so paying it is remitted to his
former rights as regards all prior parties...."
45 See, e.g., Lill v. Gleason, 92 Kan. 754, 142 Pac. 287 (1914). See BRITION, op.
cit. supra note 18, at 693.
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B. The Right of Subrogation - Sections 3-201 and 3-603(2)
of the UCC
The right of subrogation, like the right of reimbursement, orig-
inated in equity and constituted an equitable assignment of the cred-
itor's rights to the party who paid or otherwise performed the prin-
cipal's obligation. 6 Equity restricted this right to those parties who
had an interest in the matter or were legally or morally obligated to
pay or perform the principal's obligation; the right did not extend
to a mere volunteer."
The UCC makes a significant change in this regard in that sub-
section 3-603 (2) provides that any person, including a stranger or
a mere volunteer, who pays or satisfies the instrument is entitled to
the rights of a transferee. However, it should be noted that this
subsection is modified by section 3-201 which precludes a transferee
from improving his position by taking from a later holder in due
course where he has been a party to a fraud or illegality affecting the
instrument, or where, as a prior holder of the instrument, he
had notice of a claim or defense to it. This "dean hands'" provi-
sion is a carryover from the suretyship principle which denied the
assignment of rights where the party was guilty of fraud, illegality,
or equivalent misconduct." The NIL has a similar provision in
section 58." However, subsection 3-603(2) is broader in scope
than its NIL counterpart in that it provides that the rights of the
transferor are transfered regardless of the status of the parties, where-
as section 58 of the NIL is restricted to the situation where the trans-
feror is a holder in due course.
C. The Right of Exoneration - Section 1-103 of the UCC
The right of exoneration also originated in equity and provides
that where the principal is able to perform at maturity but does not,
the surety may bring an equitable action and obtain a court decree
directing the principal to perform." This right is granted to con-
46See American Sur. Co. v. Bank of Cal., 133 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1943). See RE-
STATEmENT § 141, comment a; SIMPSON 206.
47 See Marks v. Baum Bldg. Co., 73 Okla. 264, 175 Pac. 818 (1918); SIMPsoN
209.
4 8s chaeffer v. Sterling, 176 Md. 553, 6 A.2d 254 (1939). See SIMPSON 209.
49 Section 58 of the NIL provides, in part, that "a holder who derives his title
through a holder in due course, and who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument, has all the rights of such former holder in respect of all parties
prior to the latter."
50 Thomas v. St. Paul M.E. Church, 86 Ala. 138, 5 So. 508 (1889). See RESTATE-
MENT § 112; SIMPSON 198-99.
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sensual sureties only, i.e., sureties who have become such with the
consent of the principal. " Where the principal has not given his
consent to a party to become a surety, no such right exists. 2 The
reason for this limitation is that the right is based upon the princi-
pal's duty to hold the surety harmless, and consequently, where the
principal has not given his consent, no duty exists.
The NIL is silent on the surety's right of exoneration. It ap-
pears, however, that the suretyship principle -remained in effect un-
der that act.' The UCC does not contain any specific provision
dealing with the surety's right of exoneration. Nevertheless, it ap-
pears that under section 1-103 the right exists as it does in surety-
ship law.54
D. Voluntary Impleader - Section 3-803 of the UCC
Section 3-803 of the UCC provides a useful tool to a surety in
enforcing his rights of recourse against parties liable to him. This
section permits the surety to implead the party liable to him where
an action is brought on the instrument against the surety. If the
party fails to appear, he is bound by any determination of fact com-
mon to the present litigation and any subsequent litigation between
the surety and himself.55
III. OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE UCC AFFECTING SURETYSHIP
Subsection 3-415 (2) significantly changes both suretyship law
and the NIL in regard to the element of consideration. This sec-
tion provides that an accommodation party is liable to any person
who takes the instrument for value and before it is due, even though
he may have signed the instrument subsequent to its issuance by the
principal. This provision is novel in that no additional considera-
tion is necessary to bind the party. Under suretyship law, a person
who became a surety subsequent to the principal's promise was not
51 Se RESTATEmENT 5 112; SIMPSON 201.
52 Ibid.
53 It should be noted that the right of exoneration deals solely with the surety's right
against the principal and in no way affects the rights of the creditor. The UCC incor-
porates this principle into § 3-416(1) dealing with a party who guarantees payment,
and S 3-415(2) which provides that an accommodation party is liable in the capacity
in which he signed; an accommodation maker would be liable without resorting to the
principal. See SIMPsON 199.
54 Section 1-103 of the UCC provides, in effect, that the principles of law and equity
supplement the UCC unless they are displaced by a specific provision of the UCC.
55 See UCC § 3-803.
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bound unless a prior agreement had been made or unless additional
consideration was given by the creditor.56
The NIL accepts the suretyship principle on this point"r al-
though at least one commentator has advocated that the surety's
subsequent promise should be binding under section 25 of the NIL,
without additional consideration. "  In any event, subsection 3-415
(2) of the UCC clarifies the matter by providing that additional
consideration is not necessary. This position is merely an extension
of the principle that an antecedent obligation is consideration, as set
forth in section 3-408 of the UCC" and section 25 of the NIL.60
A. Limitation on the Rights of an Accommodation Party
Subsection 3-415(3) of the UCC
Subsection 3-415 (3) provides that an accommodation party can-
not introduce oral evidence of the accommodation against a holder
in due course who did not have notice of the accommodation at the
time he took the instrument. This provision prohibits the accom-
modation party from taking advantage of any surety defenses he
might otherwise have available. An example of such a situation
would be where the holder unjustifiably impairs collateral. Under
subsection 3-606(1) (b), the surety would be discharged even
though the holder had no knowledge of the accommodation; how-
ever, if the holder were a holder in due course, the accommodation
party would not be discharged unless the holder in due course had
notice6 of the accommodation, or unless the accommodation party
had a right of recourse against the party who gave the collateral and
who was discharged by operation of 3-606(1) (b). In that case,
56 First Nat'l Bank v. Hawkins, 73 Ore. 186, 144 Pac. 131 (1914). See SIMPSON
75.
57 See Ann Arbor Constr. Co. v. Glime Constr. Co., 369 Mich. 669, 120 N.W.2d
747 (1963); McAfee v. Jeter, 147 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (decided under
NIL § 29 dealing with accommodation parties); but see Parkin v. Sykes, 203 Minn.
249, 280 N.W. 849 (1938). See Jackson v. Lancaster, 213 Ala. 97, 104 So. 19
(1925); Gage v. Van Dusen, 156 Minn. 332, 194 N.W. 769 (1923) (decided under
NIL § 25 dealing with consideration).
58 See BRiTroN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 230. NIL § 25 provides, in part, that "An
antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value; and is deemed such whether the instru-
ment is payable on demand or at a future time."
59 See UCC § 3-415, comment 4.
60 See note 58 supra. In addition, it should be noted that § 3-415 (2) of the UCC
achieves the same result as §§ 63 and 64 of the NIL by using the general statement that
the "accommodation party is liable in the capacity in which he has signed even though
the taker knows of the accommodation" instead of the detailed provisions of the NIL.
61 Note that § 3-415 (3) requires notice (defined in § 1-201 (25)) as distinguished
from knowledge (defined in § 1-201(25) ).
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the accommodation party would be discharged by operation of sub-
section 3-606(1) (a).
Subsection 3-415 (3) is analogous to the traditional surety-
ship principle requiring knowledge on the part of the creditor of the
suretyship relation.12  However, there is a significant difference be-
tween the suretyship principle and subsection 3-415 (3). Surety-
ship law requires knowledge on the part of the creditor whereas sub-
section 3-415(3) requires only notice to the holder in due course.
This change made by the UCC is in keeping with the requirement of
good faith that prevails throughout the UCC' and with the basic
concept of granting special treatment only to those individuals
whose conduct is so exemplary as to be worthy of such protective
consideration.
The NIL, unlike the UCC, deals in terms of persons primarily
and secondarily liable on the instrument.64 Section 63 of the NIl
provides that an accommodation party may bind himself in any ca-
pacity. Sections 119 and 120 of the NIL provide for discharge of
the instrument and discharge of persons secondarily liable. An ac-
commodation maker under the NIL would be a party primarily
liable since his liability is unconditional;65 therefore the special
suretyship defenses66 would not be available to him under section
119, which provides for discharge of the instrument as the only
means of discharging a party primarily liable on the instrument. 7
However, an accommodation indorser is a party secondarily liable
on the instrument, since his liability is conditional," and under sec-
62 See Stewart v. Parker, 55 Ga. 656 (1876); St. Maries v. Polleys, 47 Wis. 67, 1
N.W. 389 (1879); RESTATEMENT § 114; SIMPSON 367. But see American Blower
Co. v. Lion Bending & Sur. Co., 178 Iowa 1304, 160 N.W. 939 (1917); SIMPSON
298. These authorities state that where the creditor releases the principal debtor, the
surety is discharged even though the creditor was not aware of the suretyship relation.
See also RESTATEMENT § 132.
63 UCC 1-203.
6 4 NIL 5 63.
65 NIL § 192.
66 See text accompanying notes 5-12 supra.
67NIL § 119 provides that:
A negotiable instrument is discharged:
1. By payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor,
2. By payment in due course by the party accommodated, where the in-
strument is made or accepted for accommodation;
3. By intentional cancellation thereof by the holder,
4. By any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the pay-
ment of money;
5. When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at
or after maturity in his own right.
68 See NIL 5 192.
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tion 120 of the NIL he receives three of the special defenses con-
ferred upon a surety under suretyship law. 9
B. Discharge of a Surety Other than Under Section 3-606
of the UCC
(1) Discharge of Parties.-Subsection 3-601 (1) of the UCC
contains an index to sections within Article 3 that deal with discharge
of parties. Those sections that peculiarly affect a surety will be noted
in the following discussion, but only to the extent that they affect
the discharge. Subsection 3-601 (3) provides that the liability of all
parties is discharged when a party having no right of action or re-
course on the instrument "(a) reacquires the instrument in his own
right" or "(b) is discharged by any provision of. . .Article [3]
...." This subsection makes no significant changes over any cor-
responding suretyship principles, but it does clarify certain problems
relating to terminology that exist under subsection 119(5) of the
NIL.7" Suretyship law provides that where the principal's duty to
the creditor is discharged, by performance of the principal or by an-
other on his behalf, the surety's obligation is similarly discharged.7
It appears that both subsection 3-601(3) of the UCC and subsec-
tion 119(5) of the NIL agree substantially with this principle ex-
cept that under the UCC and the NIL, where a third party performs
for the principal, neither he nor the surety is discharged unless the
principal acquires the instrument.7 It should be noted that sub-
69 Section 120 of the NIL provides that a person secondarily liable is discharged by
discharge of a prior party, by release of the principal debtor where there is no express
reservation of rights, and by an extension of the time of payment where there is no ex-
press reservation of rights by the holder or consent by the secondarily liable person. The
NIL does not refer to either notice or knowledge by the holder of the secondary liability
as a condition of discharge. Any such reference would appear to be unnecessary since
a person secondarily liable would have to clearly identify himself as such or be deemed
a person primarily liable and not entitled to the discharge, in which case the holder
would either have knowledge of the secondary capacity or be entitled to the presumption
that the party is primarily liable and not subject to discharge under § 120 of the NIL
70 The problem is primarily that of defining the meaning of "principal debtor" as
used in §§ 119(1), (5) of the NIL. See AIGLER & STE-NHEIMER, CASES ON BILLS
AND Norns 600 (1962).
71 See, e.g., Bridges v. Blake, 106 Ind. 332, 6 N.E. 833 (1885). See RESTATEMENT
5 115; SIMPSON 313.
72 UCC § 3-601 (3) provides that:
The liability of all parties is discharged when any party who has himself
no right of action or recourse on the instrument
(a) reacquires the instrument in his own right; or
(b) is discharged under any provision of this Article except as otherwise
provided with respect to discharge for impairment of recourse or
collateral (Section 3-606).
NIL § 119(5) provides for discharge of the instrument, "When the principal debtor
becomes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right."
1965]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
section 3-601 (3) (b) does not permit discharge of the surety where
the principal is discharged by operation of law other than by the
provisions contained in Article 3. Such an interpretation is consis-
tent with existing suretyship principles and the Bankruptcy Act, 3
which provide that discharge of the principal in bankruptcy does
not discharge the surety's obligation to the creditor even though it
destroys the rights of both the surety and the creditor against the
principal.74 This is a logical result since it probably was the risk of
insolvency or bankruptcy of the principal that prompted the cred-
itor to insist upon a surety to the obligation.
Suretyship law also provides that the surety is not discharged
where the creditor loses his right against the principal because of
the running of the statute of limitations."m It appears that the UCC
also agrees with this principle.76 It should be noted that under
suretyship law the surety who performs the obligation is entitled
to reimbursement from the principal if the principal's defense is
not available against him." Generally, the statute of limitations
will not have expired against the surety since it does not begin to
run until the surety gains his right of action which is not until he
performs the obligation.7" The UCC does not specifically provide
for this result but section 1-103 does state that the principles of
equity supplement the UCC unless specifically displaced by one of its
provisions.
(2) Payment or Satisfaction.-This subsection provides that the
liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment or sat-
isfaction to the holder."0 This provision is somewhat different from
suretyship law which provides that where the duty owed to the cred-
itor is discharged by performance by the principal or by another on
his behalf, the obligation of the surety is also discharged." Where
the principal performs, subsection 3-601(3) operates to discharge
73 Bankruptcy Act 5 16, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 34 (1964); SImPsoN
308.
74 Bankruptcy Act § 17, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
75 See Manchester Say. Bank v. Lynch, 151 Minn. 349, 186 N.W. 794 (1922);
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Lackland, 175 Va. 178, 88 S.B.2d 306 (1940). Contra, Hayward
v. Sencenbaugh, 141 Ill. App. 395 (1908); Auchanpaugh v. Schmitt, 70 Iowa 642, 27
N.W. 805 (1886); Johnson v. Success Brick Mach. Co., 93 Miss. 169, 46 So. 957
(1908). See also RESTATEMENT § 130.
76 See UCC § 1-103.
77 Sibley v. McAllaster, 8 N.H. 398 (1836). See RESTATEMENT 5 103; SImPSoN
227.
78 Thayer v. Daniels, 110 Mass. 345 (1872). See SIMpSON 230-31.
79 See UCC § 1-201 (20) for definition of a "holder."
80 See note 71 supra.
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the surety, but where another performs on behalf of the principal,
neither the principal nor the surety is discharged by operation of
subsection 3-601(3) unless the principal acquires the instrument."'
It is within this context that subsection 3-603 (2) should be read.
As previously noted, 2 this subsection permits any party to pay or
satisfy the instrument but it does not discharge any obligors. An
illustration of this is where A is liable to B on a negotiable instru-
ment to which C is a surety. If D, a stranger, pays B, he succeeds
to B's rights and neither A nor C is charged by the payment. The
effect of such payment or satisfaction appears to be the same as if
the instrument were purchased, since the performing party succeeds
to the rights of the transferor and no discharge results. This inter-
pretation is supported by comment 5 to section 3-603 which reiter-
ates that payment discharges only the liability of: (1) the party
making it; (2) parties having a right to recourse against the payor;
(3) intervening parties where the instrument is reacquired; and
(4) all parties only when the payor has no right of recourse on the
instrument.
Section 3-603 of the UCC significantly changes the correspond-
ing NIL provisions. First, it eliminates the concept of payment in
due course' and deals with discharge of parties to the instrument
rather than discharge of the instrument as provided in section 119
of the NIL. This change does not affect the rights and liabilities of
a surety, except that under the UCC it is clear that payment by the
surety does not discharge the principal, whereas under section 121
of the NIL some confusion exists where the surety is a primarily
liable person. 4 Second, subsection 3-603 (2) eliminates the con-
cept of payment for honor 5 by providing that any person may pay
the instrument with the consent of the holder.8 6
(3) Teder of Payment.-Subsection 3-604(2) provides that
where tender of full payment is made to the holder by any party to the
instrument when or after the instrument is due, and payment is re-
81 See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
82 See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
83 See NIL §§ 51, 88, 119. See also UCC § 3-601 (3) which provides that payment
by a party who has no right of recourse on the instrument discharges all parties.
84 See NIL § 121 which provides that where a party secondarily liable pays the in-
strument he is "remitted to his former rights .... ." Subsection 3-603 (2) eliminates
the problem presented by the quoted language. See text accompanying notes 43-45
supra.
85 See NIL §5 171-77 which state the procedure that must be followed for payment
of a bill of exchange "for honor" where the bill has been protested for non-payment.
86 See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra..
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fused by the holder, any party who has a right of recourse against
the party making tender is wholly discharged. It should be noted
that this subsection makes no reference to notice or knowledge of
the right of recourse on the part of the holder. By eliminating the
necessity of notice, subsection 3-604(2) makes a significant change
from the ordinary suretyship principle which provides that the surety
is not discharged where the creditor reasonably believes him to be a
principal." It should be emphasized that section 3-602 precludes
discharge as to a subsequent holder in due course unless he had no-
tice of the discharge at the time he took the instrument. To this
extent, the UCC agrees with traditional suretyship law.
Subsection 120(4) of the NIL contains a provision similar to
subsection 3-604 (2) of the UCC. The only significant change made
by the UCC is that it includes parties having a right of recourse
whereas the NIL is restricted to persons secondarily liable.
(4) Material Alteration.-Subsection 3-407 (2) (a) of the UCC
provides that any party is discharged as against any person other than
a subsequent holder in due course where there is an alteration of the
instrument by the holder which is fraudulent, material, and changes
the contract of the party.88 Where there is an alteration of an in-
strument which meets the requirements set forth in section 3-407 a
surety would be discharged. Moreover, if the principal was dis-
charged by operation of section 3-407, the surety would likewise be
discharged in accordance with subsection 3-601 (3) .8' Thus, section
3-407 combined with subsection 3-601 (3) reaches the same result
that is reached by the suretyship principles which discharge the
surety when the instrument is materially altered without his consent,
87 See RESTATEMENT § 116. Suretyship law proceeded on the theory that it would
be inequitable to the creditor for the tender to have any greater effect than it would
have where the creditor reasonably believed that the surety was a principal. The UCC
rejects this theory, apparently, in favor of the theory that since the creditor could have
obtained payment it would be inequitable to hold the surety since the surety's under-
taking was not to protect the creditor against loss that may result after his refusal to
accept payment.
88 This section also contains a provision that where the party assents to the alteration
or is precluded from asserting the defense there is no discharge. In addition, it has
been suggested that the use of the term "the holder" in § 3-407(2) may restrict its
applicability to the "holder at the time claim is made and the defense of alteration
is asserted." AIGLER & STEINSEIMER, op. cit. supra note 70, at 533 n.78. While this
result could be reached by some courts, it appears from a reading of the first sentence
of § 3-407 (2) that an alteration by any holder would discharge the party affected. The
sentence provides that discharge would be effective "As against any person other than
a subsequent holder in due course." UCC § 3-407(2) (Emphasis added.) In addi-
tion, comment 3 of § 3-407 supports this conclusion. It indicates that all that is ex-
cluded by § 3-407 (2) is "spoliation by any meddling stranger ......
89 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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or when the principal is discharged because of an alteration of the
instrument by the creditor. The theory underlying this result ap-
pears to be the same under suretyship principles, i.e., fraudulent
alterations by the holder are attempts to impose an obligation upon
the principal and surety that neither ever accepted.
The NIL in section 124 contains a provision similar to subsec-
tion 3-407 (2) of the UCC. The changes made by the UCC are set
forth in comment 3 of section 3-407.91
(5) Statute of Frauds.-Subsection 3-416(6) of the UCC deal-
ing with guarantees provides that "any guaranty written on the instru-
ment is enforcible notwithstanding any statute of frauds." This sub-
section is designed to avoid the effect of statutes of fraud such as the
suretyship statute, which provides that no promise to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriage of another is enforcible unless it is evi-
denced by a writing which states the consideration for the promise. 2
It is not the current commercial practice to state consideration when
a guaranty is added to a signature on a negotiable instrument, and
this subsection precludes the occurrence of any unfavorable conse-
quences from this practice. The NIL does not contain a provision
comparable to subsection 3-416(6) of the UCC relating to guaran-
tors.
(6) Notice of Dishonor.-Subsection 3-416(5) provides that
"when words of guaranty are used presentment, notice of dishonor
and protest are not necessary to charge the user." This would in-
lude situations where an indorser also signs as a guarantor,93 so that
a surety who signs in the capacity of a guarantor, whether of collec-
tion or of payment, is not entitled to presentment, or notice of dis-
honor. This is a significant change from the law of suretyship
which requires that the creditor give notice to the party that guar-
anteed collection of his inability to obtain performance from the
principal." It should be noted that under suretyship law notice of
9 0 See Schuster v. Weiss, 114 Mo. 158, 21 S.W. 438 (1893); RSTATEmHNT 5 127;
SIMPSON 330-31.
91 UCC § 3-407, comment 3 provides that the changes from the NIL § 124 are as
follows: (1) material alteration must be made by the holder, (2) material alteration
must be for a fraudulent purpose; (3) the discharge is a personal defense, and any
person whose contract is not affected by the alteration is not discharged; (4) where the
alteration is not both material and fraudulent there is no discharge.
92 See UCC § 3-416.
83 Ibid.
94See Ruben v. Jelin, 131 N.J. Eq. 299, 25 A.2d 276 (1942); RESTATEMENT §
137; SIMPSON 172.
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mere default is not necessary"5 nor is notice necessary to a party
who has guaranteed payment." Under suretyship law failure to
give the required notice would result in discharge of the surety to
the extent of injury. 7
The NIL does not contain any provisions dealing with notice to
a guarantor, but section 89 provides that notice must be given to a
drawer as well as an indorser so that if a guarantor is also an indor-
ser it appears that he is entitled to notice under section 89. In this
respect, subsection 3-416(5) of the UCC, providing that notice is
not necessary, changes the NIL.
In this context it should be noted that subsection 3-501 (2) of
the UCC requires notice of dishonor to charge all indorsers unless
such notice is excused. Failure to give notice would result in dis-
charge of the indorser9" except as to a subsequent holder in due
course without notice of the discharge at the time he took the instru-
ment.9" This provision, providing for discharge of the indorser,
appears to be a codification of the law developed under section 89
of the NIL and the law merchant.' In addition, subsection 3-501
(2) requires that notice be given to all drawers and to acceptors
of drafts payable at a bank. Failure to give the requisite notice dis-
charges these parties only to the extent of pecuniary injury resulting
from insolvency of the drawee or payor bank.' This is a change
from section 89 of the NIL which completely discharges a drawer
where proper notice of dishonor is not given. This change recog-
nizes the drawer as a secondary party but precludes the unjust en-
richment which might result if he were completely discharged with-
out suffering injury. 2
9 5 See Thomas v. Woods, 4 Cow. 173 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825); RESTATEMENT § 137;
SIMPSON 172.
9 6 See Roberts v. Hawkins, 70 Mich 566, 38 N.W. 575 (1888); RESTATEMENT 5
137; SiMpSoN 165-66.
9 7 See note 94 supra. The law of suretyship proceeded on the theory that it would
be inequitable to hold the surety to his obligation for an indefinite period after the
creditor has failed to obtain performance where the surety has been injured by failure
to receive notice. The UCC abandons this theory in favor of the commercial under-
standing of the meaning and effect of words of guaranty. See UCC § 3-416.
99UCC 5 3-502(2).
9 UCC S 3-602.
100 See 1 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACrIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 499 (1964).
101 UCC S 3-502(1) (b).
102 See IHAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 100, at 500.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While it is evident from the foregoing discussion that Article 3
of the UCC modifies both suretyship law and the NIL in favor of
modern commercial practices, it appears equally evident that the
UCC has incorporated into Article 3 many of the basic principles
and concepts of both suretyship law and the NIL.
In summary, the UCC has provisions which change or modify
both traditional suretyship law and the NIL in the areas of dis-
charge, rights of reimbursement and subrogation, notice of dishonor,
and liability of accommodation parties. In addition, the UCC elim-
inates the concept of payment in due course and payment for honor
that existed under the NIL.
In dealing with discharge, the UCC provides for discharge of
parties rather than discharge of the instrument. Furthermore, the
UCC presents an interesting problem regarding the extent of dis-
charge under section 3-606(1).
In dealing with notice of dishonor the UCC provides that such
notice need not be given to guarantors of an instrument. It further
provides that failure to give notice of dishonor to a drawer or to an
acceptor of an instrument payable at a bank, may not fully discharge
such parties, as was the result under section 89 of the NIL. The
UCC provisions affecting the rights of subrogation and reimburse-
ment are somewhat more extensive than the corresponding provi-
sions under the NIL. Moreover, a significant change is wrought by
section 3-415 (2) of the UCC in dealing with the liability of one
becoming an accommodation party after the instrument is initially
issued by the principal obligor.
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